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Non-Technical Summary 
 
This paper empirically examines the competitive strategic interaction between relationship 
and transaction banks. “Relationship banks” establish intense and long-term relations with 
their borrowers and thereby generate soft, and typically proprietary, information about the 
borrower that is hard to verify by other parties and subjective by nature (e.g., Stein, 2002). 
“Transaction banks”, in contrast, operate at arm’s length, base their lending decision on 
credit scoring models, and do not gather soft information. Their loan officers rely on 
information that is verifiable by third parties and is largely financial. Hence, soft information 
can be interpreted as a private signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a 
relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank.  
We focus on the difference between firms with positive soft information and firms with 
negative soft information. Recent theoretical models (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006; Inderst 
and Mueller, 2007) suggest that firms with positive soft information would tend to self-select 
to relationship banks, because relationship banks can take the positive private signal into 
account in the lending decision. This creates an Akerlof-type adverse selection problem, in 
which transaction banks tend to receive applications from borrowers with on average negative 
soft information. In response, transaction banks may apply a negative adjustment to the 
rating of all their loan applicants. However, if they do, even borrowers with slightly negative 
private information may be better off obtaining a loan from a relationship bank, resulting in 
an even worse pool of loan applicants with respect to the private signal and so forth. 
Ultimately, in the absence of any offsetting factor, transactions banks would no longer 
participate in the market for small business loans and some positive NPV firms may no longer 
receive credit. The selection effect may explain why banks ultimately specialize in either 
relationship or transaction banking.   
Furthermore, theory would predict that there are interaction effects with the degree of 
interbank competition. In particular, Boot and Thakor (2000) argue that there are two effects. 
When competition is introduced, banks' marginal rents from relationship lending are smaller 
and each bank thus reduces its investments in soft information. However, competition affects 
the bank's profits from both relationship and transaction lending asymmetrically. A 
relationship orientation helps to partially insulate the bank from pure price competition, so 
that an increase in competition from other banks hurts the bank's profits from transaction 
lending more than its profits from relationship lending. Thus, increased competition between 
banks may encourage banks to shift from transaction to relationship lending. 
We use a matched bank-borrower dataset of German savings banks to test these predictions. 
These banks provide an ideal laboratory, as they compete with pure transaction banks, such as 
Deutsche Bank and with pure relationship banks, such as the large number of extremely small cooperative banks in Germany. At the same time, there is sufficient variation within the 
savings bank sector in the degree to which banks incorporate soft information in their lending 
decisions. Most importantly, the dataset allows us to construct a proxy for the case when the 
private non-verifiable information about the firm was positive as opposed to when it was 
negative that is consistent across the banks in the sample. 
Using this consistent measure of soft information across banks, we show that firms are more 
likely to be upgraded by relationship banks. At the same time, transaction banks tend to 
adjust the rating downward more frequently, consistent with a broad downward ratings 
adjustment and adverse selection. We show that the effect is stronger for firms with weak 
financials and for firms that are more opaque, as for these firms positive soft information is 
more important compared to firms that are strong based on financials alone. 
Our results regarding the effect of competition on banks’ investment in soft information are 
also novel. We show that overall banks do tend to invest less in gathering soft information if 
markets are more competitive. However, there is evidence of specialization: smaller banks 
invest more in gathering soft information from risky borrowers, while larger banks reduce 
their investment. Hence, the selection effect is more pronounced in competitive markets. We 
find evidence that overall investment in gathering information is not necessarily reduced as 
competition increases. However, we do not observe a shift of transaction banks towards more 
relationship lending, as Boot and Thakor (2000) would predict. Rather, we find evidence of 
increasing specialization. 
We argue that the selection effect is at the root of this: As relationship banks invest more in 
discovering hidden gems, the likelihood that a customer approaching a transaction bank for a 
loan is a borrower with negative private information increases, exacerbating adverse selection 
and making small business lending less profitable for transaction banks. Hidden Gems and Borrowers with Dirty Little Secrets: 
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This paper empirically examines the competitive strategic interaction between relationship and 
transaction  banks.  “Relationship  banks”  establish  intense  and  long-term  relations  with  their 
borrowers and thereby generate soft, and typically proprietary, information about the borrower 
that is hard to verify by other parties and subjective by nature (e.g., Stein, 2002). “Transaction 
banks”, in contrast, operate at arm’s length, base their lending decision on credit scoring models, 
and do not gather soft information. Their loan officers rely on information that is verifiable by 
third parties and is largely financial.1 Hence, soft information can be interpreted as a private 
signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction 
bank (Inderst and Müller, 2007).  
In this paper we focus on the difference between firms with positive soft information and 
firms with negative soft information. Recent theoretical models (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006; 
Inderst and Mueller, 2007) suggest that firms with positive soft information would tend to self -
select to relationship banks, because relationship banks can take the positive private signal into 
account in the lending decision. 2 This creates an Akerlof-type adverse selection problem, in 
which transaction banks tend to receive applications from borrowers  with on average negative 
soft information. In response, transaction banks may apply a negative adjustment to the rating of 
all their loan applicants. However, if they do, even borrowers with slightly negative private 
information may be better off obtainin g a loan from a relationship bank, resulting in an even 
                                                 
1 That is not to say that loan officer do never attempt to manipulate hard information (see Berg et al., 2011). 
2  More precisely, in  Inderst and Mueller (2007) and Hauswald and Marquez (2006) , borrowers for whom the 
relationship bank’s information advantage is large approach relationship banks,  while  borrowers  for  whom  the 
relationship lender’s information advantage is small borrow from transaction banks. Thus, the probability that a 
borrower receives a loan offer from the transaction bank decreases in the information advantage of the relationship 
bank. 2 
worse pool of loan applicants with respect to the private signal and so forth. Ultimately, in the 
absence of any offsetting factor, transactions banks would no longer participate in the market for 
small business loans and some positive NPV firms may no longer receive credit. The selection 
effect may explain why banks ultimately specialize in either relationship or transaction banking.3  
Furthermore, theory would predict that there are interaction effec ts with the degree of 
interbank competition. In the literature, competition has an important effect on the degree to 
which banks will invest in gathering soft information, going back to Peterson and Rajan (1995). 
The  literature  is  ambiguous  as  whether  comp etition  would  increase  or  decrease  banks’ 
investment in gathering soft information. Boot and Thakor (2000), for example, argue that there 
are two effects. When competition is introduced, banks' marginal rents from relationship lending 
are  smaller  and  each  bank  thus  reduces  its  investments  in  soft  information.  However, 
competition  affects  the  bank's  profits  from  both  relationship  and  transaction  lending 
asymmetrically. A relationship orientation helps to partially insulate the bank from pure price 
competition, so that an increase in competition from other banks hurts the bank's profits from 
transaction lending more than its profits from relationship lending. Thus, increased competition 
between  banks  may  encourage  banks  to  shift  from  transaction  to  relationship  lending.4 
                                                 
3 In the literature, one solution to the selection problem from the perspective of transaction banks is to require 
additional collateral from their borrowers (Inderst and Müller, 2007). However, firms without the ability to post such 
collateral  would  still  be  limited  to  borrowing  from  relationship  banks.  In  addition,  transaction  banks  may  still 
participate, because due to automated screening procedures they have cost advantages relative to relationship banks 
(Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). These cost advantages tend to be largest, however, for firms that  have  sound 
financials and less so for firms where the soft information would be an important part of the decision to grant credit 
(Boot and Thakor, 2000). 
4 In Boot and Thakor (2000) , higher competition from capital markets, rather than other banks has the opposite 
effect and unambiguously reduces investment in soft information .  In our setup we are un able to test for this 
hypothesis. 3 
Empirically, this effect may result in a greater specialization of banks, where relationship banks 
increase  their  investment  in  soft  information  further  and  transaction  banks  reduce  their 
investment  further,  exacerbating  the  selection  effect  described  earlier.  However,  it  is  also 
possible that in more competitive markets, transaction banks also start investing more in soft 
information,  reducing  the  selection  effect.  Bharath  et  al.  (2007)  for  example  show  that 
transaction banks may invest more in soft information in order to cross-sell other information-
sensitive products. 
The difficulty when attempting to test these theoretical predictions is that the empirical 
researcher needs a measure of the private signal of the firm and must be able to ascertain whether 
the soft information is positive or negative. Moreover, this information needs to be consistently 
available for a cross section of relationship and transaction banks. To the best of our knowledge, 
we are the first to have access to data that permit us to construct such variables. We use a 
matched  bank-borrower  dataset  of  German  savings  banks.  These  banks  provide  an  ideal 
laboratory to test these questions, as they compete with pure transaction banks, such as Deutsche 
Bank and with pure relationship banks, such as the large number of extremely small cooperative 
banks in Germany (see Section I for more detail). At the same time, there is sufficient variation 
within the savings bank sector in the degree to which banks incorporate soft information in their 
lending decisions. In addition, we can measure direct competition to these banks well, as savings 
banks are restricted to operate locally only.  
Most importantly, the dataset allows us to construct a proxy for the case when the private 
non-verifiable information about the firm was positive as opposed to when it was negative that is 
consistent across the banks in the sample. In our data, all banks use the same rating algorithm. 4 
Therefore, the comparability of ratings across banks is ensured. It produces two types of credit 
ratings for each firm. The first consists of a financial rating that incorporates hard financial 
statement information on the borrower only. The second is a final credit rating for each firm. The 
difference  between  the  financial  rating  and  the  end  rating  reveals  the  non-financial  soft 
information on the borrower that was used in the lending decision. The final rating may be 
higher or lower than the financial rating, which gives us information about whether the private 
soft information of the firm was positive or negative and how important the soft information 
component is for a given borrower.  
Using this consistent measure of soft information across banks, we first establish that 
there  is  sufficient  variation  in  the  degree  to  which  banks  use  soft  information  in  lending 
decisions. As predicted by theory (Stein, 2002) and consistent with prior empirical evidence 
(Cole  et  al.,  2004;  Berger  et  al.,  2005;  Liberti  and  Mian,  2009),  smaller  banks  use  more 
discretion  in  lending.  The  effect,  however,  is  asymmetric,  as  predicted  by  the  selection 
hypothesis.  Firms  are  more  likely  to  be  upgraded  by  relationship  banks.  At  the  same  time, 
transaction banks tend to adjust the rating downward more frequently, consistent with a broad 
downward ratings adjustment and adverse selection. We show that the effect is stronger for firms 
with  weak  financials  and  for  firms  that  are  more  opaque,  as  for  these  firms  positive  soft 
information  is  more  important  compared  to  firms  that  are  strong  based  on  financials  alone. 
Hence, ex ante, the customers of small banks appear riskier based on financial information alone.  
In order to distinguish the idea that relationship banks are better at discovering hidden 
gems  from  other  potential  explanations  for  our  findings  (such  as  private  benefits  of  loan 
officers),  we  examine  whether  ex  post  the  probability  of  default  of  firms  with  positive  soft 5 
information is higher than for other firms. Hence, we link the ex ante use of hard versus soft 
information by relationship and transaction banks in the lending decision to the ex post default 
probability of the borrower. Doing this, we do not find that firms that were upgraded based on 
soft information are ex post more likely to default. Hence, we can reject that loan officers simply 
use  greater  discretion  to  grant  loans  to  worse  customers,  who  provide,  for  example,  greater 
private benefits to the loan officers. We also provide some evidence that the transaction banks’ 
informational disadvantage is compensated for by greater cost-efficiency in lending.  
Our results regarding the effect of competition on banks’ investment in soft information are 
also interesting and novel. We show that overall banks do tend to invest less in gathering soft 
information  if  markets  are  more  competitive.  However,  there  is  evidence  of  specialization: 
smaller banks invest more in gathering soft information from risky borrowers, while larger banks 
reduce their investment. Hence, the selection effect is more pronounced in competitive markets. 
The evidence is broadly consistent with the theoretical ideas in Boot and Thakor (2000). We find 
evidence  that  overall  investment  in  gathering  information  is  not  necessarily  reduced  as 
competition increases. However, we do not observe a shift of transaction banks towards more 
relationship lending, as Boot and Thakor (2000) would predict. Rather, we find evidence of 
increasing specialization. We argue that the selection effect is at the root of this: As relationship 
banks invest more in discovering hidden gems, the likelihood that a customer approaching a 
transaction bank for a loan is a borrower with a dirty secret increases, exacerbating adverse 
selection and making small business lending less profitable for transaction banks.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section sketches the previous 
literature.  Section  II  presents  some  institutional  background  on  German  savings  banks.  In 6 
Section III, we describe our dataset. Section IV presents our empirical results. Section V presents 
some robustness checks and extensions. The last section concludes. 
I.  Literature 
Our paper builds on a large body of literature on the role of relationships in banking. At a 
general level, relationship lending theory is based on the idea that financial intermediaries have a 
competitive advantage in the production of information about borrowers (Boyd and Prescott, 
1986). In particular, Cole et al. (2004) and Berger et al. (2005) show that smaller banks have 
stronger borrower relationships than larger banks due to a smaller number of managerial layers 
between the loan officers and the bank management in small banks (Stein, 2002; Williamson, 
1967). Liberti and Mian (2009) provide evidence that the greater the hierarchical distance, the 
less the importance of soft information on the borrower in the process of credit approval. Thus, 
smaller banks are better in producing soft information on the borrower than larger banks thanks 
to their organizational structure. 
Most  of  the  previous  literature  on  bank-borrower  relationships  focused  on  their 
implications for the borrowers. Berger and Udell (1995) show that stronger relationships lead to 
lower collateral requirements and lower interest rates charged. Berger et al. (2005) and Cole et 
al. (2004) also show that smaller banks lend to more opaque clients while large banks focus on 
large firms with good accounting records. In addition, stronger bank-borrower relationships may 
increase the availability of credit for the borrower (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 
1995) even in situations of rating downgrades (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). Jiménez and Saurina 7 
(2004) show that stronger bank-borrower relationships increase the willingness to lend to riskier 
borrowers.5  
In much of the previous empirical literature, soft information is not directly observed and 
instead indirectly approximated. For instance, Cerqueiro et al. (2011) investigate the importance 
of discretion in loan rate setting. They use a heteroscedastic regression model to see which 
factors determine the dispersion in banks’ loan rates to SMEs.6 There are three recent notable 
exceptions that have access to a direct measure of soft information like this paper. One, Degryse 
et  al.  (2011)  use  very  detailed  data  from  one  bank  and  show  that  only  soft  information  is 
explaining observed loan officer discretion. In addition, soft information is found to be important 
to determine the loan volume. This paper differs from Degryse et al. (2011) in that we are able to 
analyze the selection of borrowers to relationship and transaction banks, respectively, because 
we have consistent data on the use of soft information for a cross section of banks. Second, Puri 
et al. (2011) use retail loan applications and find that loan applications, that were rejected based 
on financial credit scoring, are more likely to be approved based on soft information in the case 
of existing borrowers and those of lower credit quality. In this paper, we rather use data on the 
role of soft information in commercial borrower loan decisions. It is possible that the production 
of  soft  information  is  more  important  for  this  type  of  borrower  given  the  higher  degree  of 
information  asymmetry  between  bank  and  borrower.7  The third paper is less related to our 
                                                 
5 Closer bank-borrower relationships can also create informational monopolies for the bank, which result in hold-up 
problems and deteriorating loan terms (see for instance Boot, 2000).  
6 Garcia-Appendini (2011) and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) are further examples for indirect approximations. 
7 Our paper also relates to the literature on the relation of size and risk. Especially in the wake of the financial crisis 
of 2007/2008, the debate about divestures of banks into smal ler operational units in order to reduce risk was 
 8 
research  question.  Brown  et  al.  (2012)  analyze  the  role  of  loan  officer  discretion  in  credit 
assessment  at  nine  banks.  They  show  that  loan  officers  use  their  discretion  to  smooth  a 
borrower’s credit rating. However, their smoothing behavior is unlikely to be driven by soft 
information. 
II.  Institutional Background 
Germany is an ideal laboratory to study the questions of this paper. The German banking 
market is almost evenly split between three types of banks: savings banks (the focus of this 
paper) and federal state banks8, credit cooperatives, and commercial banks. It is characterized by 
a low level of concentration with around 450 different savings banks,  more than 1,000 credit 
cooperatives,  and  around  300  privately  owned  commercial  banks.  Savings  banks,  hence, 
compete both with banks that can be characterized as “transaction” banks, such as the large 
commercial banks (Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank), as well as banks that are pure “relationship” 
banks, such as cooperative banks. Small savings banks typically have only one or two branches 
and  flat  hierarchies  and  seem  excellent  candidates  for  banks  that  are  able  to  assign  a  large 
amount  of  discretion  to  loan  officers,  while  large  savings  banks  may  operate  much  like 
                                                                                                                                                             
prominently pursued.  The main focus so far has been on the effect that larger banks increase risk because of explicit 
or implicit public guarantees ("too big to fail") due to moral hazard (Merton, 1977; Bhattacharya et al., 1998). 
According to theory, large banks, which are perceived as "too big to fail", are more likely to be bailed-out and have 
therefore incentives to increase risk. These predictions have been empirically tested by many studies. For instance, 
Boyd and Runkle (1993) and Gropp et al. (2011) find evidence for a positive correlation between size and risk. In 
addition, most papers point towards higher failure probabilities at larger banks (e.g., De Nicoló, 2001). 
8 Each savings bank is affiliated with one federal state bank (“Landesbank”) and each federal state bank is affiliated 
with a state or group of states. The federal state banks facilitate the transfer of liquidity from savings banks with 
excess liquidity to those with liquidity shortfalls. In addition, the federal state banks secure market funding through 
the issuance of bonds. For an in-depth description of the German banking market see Hackethal (2004). 9 
transaction banks with numerous branches and many layers of hierarchy. Hence, we feel we have 
sufficient cross sectional variation in the use of soft information in lending decisions to study our 
question. At the same time, all savings banks that are members of the savings banks association 
use the same rating system. As we use the rating system to measure the use of soft information in 
lending decisions (explained in more detail below), we have a measure that is consistent across 
all banks in the sample.  
Taken as a group, savings banks in Germany have more than Euro 1 trillion in total assets 
and 22,000 branches. German savings banks focus on traditional banking business with virtually 
no off-balance sheet operations.9 Their main financing sources are customer deposits, which they 
transform into loans to households and firms. They do not compete with each other, as a regional 
separation applies: each savings bank uniquely serves its local market (similar to the geographic 
banking restrictions that existed up to the 1990s in the U.S.). Finally, the savings banks make use 
of  a  relatively similar compensation system for loan officers, which largely rely on fixed 
contracts.10 In our dataset, the median commission payments over regular staff expenses, which 
approximate the loan officer bonus payments, is only around 2%. It thus seems very unlikely that 
any of our results are driven by loan officer incentive issues. 
Savings banks in our sample are on average relatively profitable in the observation period 
2002-2006: average pre-tax ROE is 8.9% while the average cost to income ratio is 80.6%. 
Notwithstanding the differences in governance, savings banks appear very similar to private 
                                                 
9 Savings banks in Germany are obliged by law to serve the “common good” of their community by providing 
households and local firms with easy access to credit. 
10  Agarwal  and  Ben -David  (2012)  show  that  loan  origination -based  incentive  compensation  increases  loan 
origination and the bank’s credit risk. 10 
commercial banks of comparable size in continental Europe. Pretax ROE of commercial banks is 
9.8% in continental Europe and 8.2% in the UK (186 small banks, 2002-2004, data is from 
Bankscope). Similarly, cost to income ratios are 81.6% in continental Europe and 70.6% in the 
UK. Overall, despite their unique governance structure, German savings banks look like a fairly 
typical set of commercial banks in continental Europe. 
III.  Data  
A. Matching of Bank and Borrower Information 
Our  main  dataset  consists  of  matched  bank-borrower  information.  We  start  with  an 
exhaustive dataset of commercial borrowers of the savings banks. It provides annual balance 
sheets and income statements of all commercial loan customers of the 452 German savings banks 
affiliated with the German Savings Banks Association.11 The borrowers are largely small and 
medium size enterprises (SME), which strongly rely on bank loans. 
This dataset’s unique feature is its hard and soft information for each loan customer. 
Specifically,  the  data  set  contains  77,364  credit  ratings  for  the  years  2002-2006  of  60,696 
borrowers.12 The ratings are based on an internal and proprietary rating algorithm. All savings 
banks use the same rating algorithm, therefore the comparability of the rating is ensured. It 
produces a score from 1 to 21, where 1 equals AAA, 2 equals AA+, etc. until 21 equals C. Thus, 
                                                 
11 There are seven savings banks in Germany that are not full members in the savings banks association. They are 
not covered in the dataset. 
12 Our observation period starts in 2002 because a new rating system was introduced in that year. 11 
the higher the numerical rating, the riskier is the borrower. The rating information is split into 
two components. The first consists of a financial rating that incorporates hard financial statement 
information  on  the  borrower.  The  data  also  contain  a  final  credit  rating  for  each  firm.  The 
difference  between  the  financial  rating  and  the  end  rating  reveals  the  non-financial  soft 
information on the borrower that was used in the lending decision such as management quality, 
the firm’s strategy, and perceived product or service quality. We interpret this difference as a 
private signal that the borrower can send to a relationship bank but not to a transaction bank. 
Depending on whether the deviation from the financial rating is negative or positive, i.e. the end 
rating is higher or lower than the financial rating, we use this as a proxy for a firm’s private 
information that is positive or negative and only observable to the bank to the degree it invests in 
gathering soft information. 
We construct  five different  variables based on the rating information: i) the absolute 
difference  between  the  financial  and  the  end  rating;  ii)  the  probability  of  a  rating  upgrade 
because of the soft information; iii) the probability of a rating downgrade because of the soft 
information; iv) the strength of the rating upgrade in numerical rating notches; v) the strength of 
the rating downgrade in numerical rating notches. Hence, in the empirical analysis below we can 
distinguish  between  downgrades  based  on  soft  information  and  upgrades  based  on  soft 
information,  which  enables  us  to  explicitly  test  for  borrower  selection  based  on  privately 
observed soft information. Our dataset also enables us to link the use of soft information with ex 
post defaults to address any biased use of soft information by loan officers 
In principal, the difference between the financial rating and the end rating may reflect 
three different items (Degryse et al., 2011): (i) private hard information from the transaction 12 
accounts of the firm and its owner. This information is not publicly observable, but verifiable by 
senior management. (ii) Soft information that is not verifiable by senior management. (iii) Loan 
officer discretion. In the following we assume that relationship banks and transaction banks do 
not  differ  in  the  ability  to  take  (i)  into  account  and  use  the  terms  “soft  information”  and 
“discretion” interchangeably. This approach is supported by the findings in Degryse et al. (2011), 
who show for very detailed borrower information from one bank in Argentina that only non-
verifiable soft information but not verifiable hard information guide loan officer discretion.  
Merging borrower level with the bank level dataset comes at a cost: in order to ensure 
some degree of anonymity of customers, the matching of borrowers to savings banks is possible 
only aggregated in groups of 5-12 savings banks. In total, there are 62 savings bank groups with 
rating data available. The aggregation was done by the savings banks association and savings 
banks of the same region were lumped together, except, that larger savings banks were put into 
large bank groups. This helps in preserving enough heterogeneity with respect to average bank 
group  size.  Hence,  while  we  have  precise  information  on  the  individual  bank  and  on  the 
individual customer, we only know that the customer banked with any one of the group.  
In the previous literature, bank size is found to be a good indicator for tighter bank-
borrower relationships (Cole et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2005). Berger et al. (2005) show that 
large banks tend to approve or reject loan applications primarily via credit scores, entirely based 
on  financial  information.  Potential  soft  information  on  the  borrower  is  not  taken  into 
consideration. The explanation is that, if the number of hierarchy levels between the loan officer 
and  the  management  is  larger,  decisions  of  the  scoring  system  are  overruled  more  often  in 
management  decisions  or  loan  officers  have  fewer  incentives  to  gather  the  soft  information 13 
(Liberti and Mian 2009). The more branches  for example a bank has, the more disperse its 
geographical footprint and the farther the physical distance between the individual loan officers 
and the bank's management.13  
We use three measures for bank size: the natural logarithm of the average bank assets per 
group of savings banks, the number of bank branches, and the number of bank employees in 
terms of full time equivalents (FTE). Assets are very common in the literature and well-suited as 
they are relatively stable and not as much affected by the business cycle as a bank’s revenues or 
profits. However, when measuring the strength of a relationship between a bank and a borrower 
(Williamson, 1967; Liberti and Mian, 2009), another appropriate measure might be the number 
of branches or the number of employees of each savings bank. We throughout report results 
based on the bank assets and use the other two size measures as robustness checks. All results go 
through independently of the size measure used. 
A further variable of particular interest in this paper is competition. As we emphasized in 
section I, savings banks are regionally restricted in the operations. Hence, we can control for the 
regional level of competition (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005) by using the ratio of branches of direct 
competitors (commercial banks and cooperative banks) to savings banks branches per group of 
savings banks and year in their region.14 The data comes from the Bundesbank.  
We also use other regional control variables. The number of mergers for the savings bank 
per year is intended to control for weakening bank -borrower relationships in the wake of a 
                                                 
13 Degryse and Ongena (2005) show that loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and the lending bank 
and increase with the distance between the firm and competing banks. However, the distance to the borrower is not 
available for our dataset. 
14 „Region“ here refers to a county („Kreis“) or a municipal area („Stadt“). 14 
merger (Di Patti and Gobbi, 2007).15 We also control by the average debt per capita of the 
community that the savings bank is loc ated in. With this variable we attempt to control for 
heterogeneity in local public finances, which may be reflected in the operations of the local 
banks. The variable comes from the federal statistical office of Germany (“Destatis”).  
An important advantage of the dataset is the possibility to relate the ex ante financial risk 
and ex post defaults of the banks’ commercial loan customers. We have two measures for a 
borrower’s ex ante financial risk: One, the financial rating described above, which does not 
include the adjustment for soft information. Second, we use an Altman-type (1968) Z-Score, 
which is calibrated to the German market (Engelmann et al., 2003). A higher Z-Score indicates a 
lower risk associated with the borrower. For all commercial loan customers in the data we also 
have an ex post default measure, which equals 1 if the firm repaid principal or interest more than 
90 days late in the 12 months after the credit rating was assigned and 0 otherwise. We also 
control  for  borrower  size  (natural  logarithm  of  total  assets),  as  Stanton  (2002)  shows  that 
managers  are  more  efficient  in  monitoring  fewer  large  loans.  Furthermore,  soft  information 
should be more important for opaque firms. We use the borrowers' legal form to distinguish 
between closely held firms (OhG, Personengesellschaft) and incorporated firms (GmbH, AG 
etc.), as closely held firms have much lower accounting and accounting standards. We use a 
dummy variable, Opaque borrower, that equals 1 for the former and 0 for the latter type of firms. 
                                                 
15 However, Berger et al. (1998) provide evidence that reduced small business lending is offset by the reactions of 
other banks. 15 
We also control for changes in the macroeconomic environment over time. We use the 
relative change in the ifo-Index, which is a nation-wide forward-looking business climate index 
of the ifo institute. We also employ the average daily risk-free interest rate at the national level 
(Bundesbank data), in order to control for the relationship between interest rates and credit risk 
as there is a growing body of literature showing that low short-term interest rates may be related 
to softer lending standards and increased risk taking (Ioannidou et al., 2009; Jiménez et al., 
2011). Please refer to Table 1 for all variable definitions. 
 
[Table 1: variable definitions about here] 
B. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables. We first discuss variables, 
which are on the borrower level. The average absolute change in rating based on soft information 
on the borrower is 2.02 notches, which indicates a significant influence of soft information on 
the  final  rating  decision.  Upgrades,  i.e.  the  final  rating,  indicate  a  lower  risk  due  to  soft 
information than the financial rating, are observed with a frequency of 25% and have an average 
magnitude of 2.48 numerical rating notches. Downgrades are more frequently observed with 
60% and on average slightly less strong with 2.37 notches. The rating remains unchanged for 
15% of the borrowers. The average Z-Score for the borrower is 3.41 while the average financial 
rating is 12.4 (corresponding to a long-term credit rating of BB). Both measures approximate 
financial risk from an ex ante perspective. On average, 4.8% of the borrowers in our sample 
default in the 12 months following the rating assignment. Sorting upgrades based on the financial 
rating reveals that upgrades are more likely for very risky ratings because these would not have 16 
received  loan  offers  without  positive  soft  information.  We  observe  the  reverse  pattern  for 
downgrades.  
 
[Table 2: descriptive statistics about here] 
 
Next we show bank group descriptive statistics. Average assets of bank groups are Euro 
2.28 billion. The dispersion of bank size is large. The 95th percentile of the bank assets is more 
than 14 times the 5th percentile. This suggests that we may have sufficient within savings bank 
variation in the use of soft information to assume that bank-borrower relations are of different 
strength, but we will test for whether large savings banks adjust the ratings of their customers 
less based on soft information compared to small savings banks formally below. The number of 
direct  competitors is  less  than one on average,  indicating a rather low level  of competition. 
Merger activity was extensive during our sample period. On average, the savings bank groups 
were involved in a merger every third year.  
Looking at further national control variables, the change in the ifo-index is on average 
positive, which reflects Germany’s healthy economic phase in 2004-2006. The risk-free interest 
rate was on average 2.28% indicating low interest rate levels in Germany in the analyzed time 
period.  The  average  assets  of  the  borrowers  are  Euro  616,000,  which  demonstrates  that  the 
savings banks mostly engage in SME lending.  17 
IV.  Results 
A. Borrower Self-Selection 
As a first step, we check whether small savings banks deviate more from financial ratings 
than large savings banks. This would suggest that we indeed observe cross-sectional variation in 
the use of soft information in our sample. We present univariate results in Panel A of Table 3. 
We split the borrowers according to their bank groups’ average assets. The last column shows 
the t-values of univariate regressions to test for differences of the smallest versus the largest 
savings banks. We find that the average absolute difference between financial rating and end 
rating, |Δ Rating|, is significantly higher for the smallest than for the largest savings banks. 
Smaller banks thus seem to use more discretion in lending than larger banks. This is consistent 
with the previous literature that smaller banks produce more soft information (Berger et al., 
2005;  Uchida  et  al.,  2012). More importantly,  the effect  is  not  symmetric for  upgrades  and 
downgrades. A rating upgrade is 3.7% more likely for small than for large savings banks, which 
accounts to around 15% of the unconditional upgrade likelihood (see Table 2). In addition, given 
they upgrade, the upgrade is by significantly more rating notches. In contrast, smaller banks do 
not use soft information to downgrade borrowers more often, nor do they downgrade by more 
notches compared to large banks. A rating downgrade is rather more likely for large than for 
small savings banks, however, the difference is not significant. Hence, we obtain first evidence 
for the hypothesis that borrowers with positive soft information self-select to smaller and more 
relationship oriented banks that are more likely to take this information into account. 
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[Table 3: banks size and soft information about here] 
 
Encouraged by the univariate results we now present some regressions. It is possible, for 
instance, that the univariate effects are due to regional differences across local markets. Panel B 
of Table 3 shows regression results with the five different measures for discretion in lending as 
dependent variables and the bank size measure as the main independent variable.16 The first 
column of Panel B shows that the absolute difference between the financial and the end rating, 
|Δ Rating|, is larger for smaller banks. As in the case of the univariate results, the effect is again 
not symmetric for upgrades and downgrades. Column 2 shows that smaller banks do seem to be 
significantly more likely to upgrade their borrowers based on soft information. In addition, given 
they upgrade, the upgrade is by significantly more rating notches (column 4). In contrast, smaller 
banks do not use soft information to downgrade borrowers more often (column 3), nor do they 
downgrade by more notches compared to large banks (column 5). We thus find evidence in favor 
of the selection hypothesis: borrowers with positive soft information are more likely to obtain a 
loan from small relationship lenders, borrowers with negative soft information are not. 
Control variables also offer interesting insights. As expected, larger borrowers are less 
likely to be upgraded and rating adjustments are smaller.17 Larger borrowers tend to be less 
opaque, because reporting quality is better on average, and, hence, soft information is less 
                                                 
16 We use OLS models throughout since differences to using Probit models for the binary dependent variables in 
columns two and three are negligible. 
17 On the other hand, and to our surprise, they are more likely to be downgraded based on soft information than 
smaller borrowers. This finding is, however, not robust to us ing different size measures. These results are available 
from the authors upon request. 19 
important in their assessment for a loan. In addition, upgrades based on soft information are less 
likely in years with a merger between two (or more) savings banks, consistent with some loss of 
soft information of merged banks and the previous literature (see e.g. most recently Ogura and 
Uchida, 2012).  
These results are important for two reasons. One, they relate our new proxies for the 
extent to which banks use soft information to bank size, which has been used in the previous 
literature (e.g., Berger et al., 2005; Cole et al., 2004). Column 1 of Panel B shows that small 
banks use more discretion in lending. Second, columns 2 to 5 suggest that small banks use 
additional discretion to upgrade firms (i.e. to improve upon the rating they would have received 
based on financial information alone), but not to downgrade firms (i.e. to decrease the rating 
firms  would  have  received  based  on  financial  information  alone).  This  is  consistent  with  a 
selection effect: firms with positive soft information self-select to small relationship banks that 
are  more  likely  to  take  this  information  into  account,  while  borrowers  with  negative  soft 
information  self-select  to larger banks that do  not  take the soft information component into 
account.18 We also find that larger banks tend to downgrade borrowers more often, although we 
do not obtain a statistically signif icant coefficient. We interpret this as  tentative evidence that 
large banks attempt to take the selection effect into account by downgrading borrowers across 
the board. 
                                                 
18 It is possible that loan officers of small banks use their discretion inefficiently to upgrade borrowers that provide 
loan officers with greater private benefits. This is investigated below. 20 
B. Financially Riskier and Opaque Borrowers 
If firms with better soft information self-select towards smaller banks that are more likely 
to take soft information into account, is this effect stronger for firms with particularly weak 
financials?  For  firms  with  weak  financials  it  should  be  particularly  valuable  if  positive  soft 
information is taken into account in the lending decision. We measure the extent of positive soft 
information by the upgrade probability, Upgrade, i.e. whether the bank improved the end rating 
compared to the financial rating. As a measure of the financial risk of a borrower we use the Z-
Score, which is decreasing in risk. In addition, in the regressions below we use the borrowers’ 
financial rating. Both measures are strictly limited to financial characteristics and do not include 
soft information. 
 
[Table 4: univariate selection and financial risk about here] 
 
Table 4 shows the univariate results. We split the matched bank borrower dataset into 
quartiles, sorted according to the borrowers’ Z-Score. We use the firm’s Z-Score instead of the 
financial rating, because it is independent of the bank’s assessment of the borrower. The first row 
includes the riskiest borrowers, while the fourth row contains the safest borrowers. The first and 
second columns show the upgrade probability for the smallest and the largest bank size quartile. 
Bank size is measured according to the sum of bank group assets in the respective year. We find 
that smaller banks are 3.7% more likely to upgrade their borrowers compared with larger banks 
(significant at the 10% level). This effect is more pronounced for the riskiest borrowers. The 
difference  is  8.2%  for  the  riskiest  Z-Score  quartile  (significant  at  the  1%  level)  while  the 21 
difference  is  only  2.0%  for  the  safest  Z-Score  quartile  (not  significant).  The  differences-in-
differences term is 6.2% and significant at the 1% level. 
 
[Table 5: selection, financial risk and competition about here] 
 
Table  5,  columns  I  to  IV,  shows  the  regression  results.19  We  regress  Upgrade  on 
borrower  risk,  bank  size,  local  competition  and  the  controls.  We  form  interaction  terms  to 
capture the bank size-borrower risk relationship that we discovered in the univariate analysis. We 
report  results  for  two  measures  of  firms’  financial  risk:  Z-Score  and  the  financial  rating. 
Specifically, the dummy variable Risky borrower equals 1 for borrowers in the riskiest Z-Score 
(financial rating) quartile and 0 otherwise. The dummy variables Small bank equals 1 for the 
smallest size quartile and 0 for the largest bank size quartile.  
Columns I and II show the individual effects or firm financial risk without interaction 
terms.  We  find  that  riskier  borrowers  are  more  likely  to  be  upgraded  due  to  positive  soft 
information. The specification of columns III and IV also include the interaction term Risky 
borrower * Small bank. Smaller banks are 3.9% (that is -1.6% + 5.5%) more likely to upgrade ex 
ante financially risky borrowers compared to financially safe borrowers based on the Z-Score. 
The effect is even more pronounced for the financial rating. Both results are significant at the 1% 
level. Note that the unconditional probability to receive a rating upgrade is 24.5% (see Table 2). 
                                                 
19  We  again  use  OLS  models  since  differences  to  using  Probit  models  for  the  binary  dependent  variables  are 
negligible. 22 
Concentrating on riskier borrowers, we find an economically and statistically significant effect 
since riskier borrowers in column 3 are 7.3% (that is 1.8% + 5.5%) more likely to receive a 
rating upgrade because of positive soft information at a small bank compared to the case of a 
risky borrower at a large bank. The effect is about the same magnitude if we use the financial 
rating to sort the borrowers in column 4. This result is in line with the idea that riskier borrowers 
(based on financial characteristics) who have substantial positive soft (private) information have 
a stronger incentive to apply for a loan with a bank that takes the soft information into account.  
Selection would also predict that large banks should be more likely to adjust the rating of 
borrowers downward, because they are concerned that the borrowers with negative private soft 
information are particularly likely to apply for a loan at a large bank. This effect should be 
particularly strong for financially risky borrowers. In Panel B of Table 4 we show that this is 
indeed the case: The borrowers in the riskiest two quartiles of the distribution are 6-8 percentage 
points more likely to be downgraded by a large bank than by a small bank. The difference 
between the downgrade probability of safer borrowers between large and small banks is not 
significant, although negative. We concede, of course, that we cannot fully distinguish between 
the situation in which the large bank actually observes negative soft information versus that case 
that we have focused on, in which the bank simply downgrades because it cannot observe the 
private signal, but knows that it is likely to be negative, as those with positive signals would be 
better off getting credit from a relationship bank that can observe the signal. 
 
[Table 6: selection and opacity about here] 
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To tackle the incentives to generate soft information from a different angle, we use the 
firms’ legal form to distinguish between more and less opaque borrowers (Berger et al., 2005; 
Cole et al., 2004).20 Results are shown in  Table 6. Opaque borrowers are 6.5% more likely to 
receive  a  rating  upgrade  based  on  soft  information  (column  1).  This  individual  effect  is 
significant on the 1% level. Column 2 shows the interaction effect between bank size and 
opaqueness. We find that small banks are 3.4% more likely to upgrade opaque borrowers than 
large banks. This differential effect is significant at the 10% level.  
Overall, we find a striking asymmetry: Small, relationship banks are much more likely to 
adjust the credit rating of borrowers upward. We observe the exact opposite for large, transaction 
banks, who are much more likely to adjust the credit rating of borrowers downward. Both of 
these effects are especially operative for firms that are financially risky and opaque. Hence, the 
investment in soft information of relationship banks is important for financially risky firms that 
have positive private information only available to the relationship bank, as they in the absence 
of relationship banks may be unable to obtain credit at the same terms.  
C. Borrower Self-selection and Competition 
We next check whether the selection effect is related to local competition. Hauswald and 
Marquez (2006) argue that banks will invest less in the acquisition of (soft) information in more 
competitive  markets,  because  they  have  to  share  rents  with  the  borrowers.  In  contrast,  the 
predictions in Boot and Thakor (2000) are more differentiated: While they acknowledge the 
                                                 
20 Our full set of covariates, for which we omit displaying results in Table 6, includes the Z-Score to control for 
differences in ex ante financial risk. In Table 5, we also include the Opaque borrower dummy variable.  24 
existence of the effect of increased rent sharing with borrowers and they also argue that banks 
may invest more in gathering soft information in competitive markets in order to avoid direct 
price competition. We can investigate these arguments in our sample. We use data from the 
Bundesbank on the number of branches of other banks in the local market the savings bank 
operates in and define a dummy variable, High competition, that takes on the value of 1 if the 
bank operates in a market that is above median and 0 otherwise. We would then interpret a 
negative relationship between higher competition and Upgrade as a reduction in the investment 
of banks in the generation of soft information. We furthermore interact High competition with 
bank size to analyze whether relationship banks maintain their investment in soft information 
compared to transaction banks. In addition, we interact High competition with the borrowers’ 
risk  to  check  whether  banks  concentrate  their  investment  in  soft  information  for  riskier 
borrowers. 
In columns I and II of Table 5 we document an overall tendency to reduce investment 
into  soft  information  in  more  competitive  markets.  We  obtain  negative  coefficients  on  the 
individual High competition dummy variable as predicted by Hauswald and Marquez (2006), 
although  the  coefficient  is  only  statistically  significant  in  column  II.  If  banks  invest  less  in 
information acquisition in more competitive markets that may suggest that financially risky firms 
with  positive soft information  may no longer  be able to  obtain credit in  these markets. We 
investigate  this  issue  in  more  detail  by  including  two-way  interaction  terms  between  the 
competition  level  and  bank  size,  and,  in  separate  regressions,  with  borrower  risk.  First,  we 
concentrate on the differential effect with respect to bank size. In Table 7 we show results, in 
which  we  check  whether  relationship  banks  adjust  their  investment  in  soft  information 25 
differently from transaction banks. In column I we find that smaller banks are slightly more 
likely to upgrade borrowers in more competitive markets (0.5%, that is 1.8% - 5.9% +4.6%) 
while large banks are less likely to do so (-5.9%). The difference between small and large banks 
is 6.4% and is significant at the 1% level. This difference is smaller for the financial rating in 
column II but still significant at the 5% level.  
 
[Table 7: competition interaction effects about here] 
 
Second, we focus on the differential effect with respect to the borrowers’ ex ante risk 
level. In columns III and IV of Table 7, we show results in which we analyze whether banks 
maintain  their  investment  in  soft  information  for  financially  riskier  borrowers  compared  to 
financially safer borrowers. For the Z-Score as risk measure in column III, we find banks are 
more prone to upgrade riskier borrowers in competitive markets (2.4%, that is 1.1% - 2.4% + 
3.7%) while banks are less likely to upgrade safer borrowers in competitive markets (-2.4%). 
The difference is 4.8% and significant at the 1% level. The effect is even more pronounced when 
using the financial rating as a control in column IV of Table 5.  
In the last two columns of the table we analyze a bank’s investments in soft information 
in  more competitive markets by using  three way  interaction terms  between  competition,  the 
financial risk of the borrower, and the size of the bank. That way, we are able to estimate the 
probability of a financially risky firm to receive an upgrade from a small bank in a competitive 
market. Compared to a financially safe firm at a large bank in a competitive market, these firms 
are 9.3% more likely to receive an upgrade using  Z-Score as a measure of financial risk in 26 
column V (significant at the 1% level).21 For the financial rating as risk me asure, the effect is 
again more pronounced and also highly significant (Table 7, column VI).  
Columns  IV and V of  Table 6  include the results for the interaction between the 
competition level and opaqueness. We find evidence that in highly competitive markets, opaque 
firms are 7.5% more likely to receive an upgrade than more transparent firms. The last column 
includes the three way interaction terms between competition, the opaqueness of the borrower, 
and the size of the bank. That way, we are able to estimate the probability of an opaque firm to 
receive  an  upgrade  from  a  small  bank   in  a  competitive  market .  We  find  that  in  highly 
competitive markets, opaque firms at small banks are 11.6% more likely to receive an upgrade 
compared to more transparent firms at large banks. This effect is significant on the 1% level.  
We thus find further support for our interpretation that smaller banks specialize on soft 
information production in more competitive markets; they not only do that for riskier firms 
(Table 7) but also for more opaque firms ( Table 6). Hence, the selection effect of  riskier and 
more opaque borrowers towards relationship banks is more pronounced in more competitive 
markets. 
These results support the idea that in more competitive markets overall the generation of 
information  is  reduced.  However,  we  also  find  evidence  in  favor  of  specialization  in  more 
competitive markets: larger banks reduce their investment in information, while small banks do 
not. Hence, the selection effect of financially riskier borrowers selecting towards relationship 
banks is even more pronounced in more competitive markets. 
                                                 
21 We need to sum up all displayed coefficients in column V of Table 7 and to subtract -5.2%.  27 
 
D. Ex Post Credit Outcomes 
Relationship banks lend to borrowers that exhibit ex ante weaker financial characteristics. 
However, these borrowers tend to be upgraded based on positive soft information that transaction 
banks are unable to use. Next we examine whether this use of soft information results in overall 
riskier outcomes ex post. Clearly, if banks use the soft information in an unbiased way, the 
customers  with  ex  ante  weaker  financial  information  may  not  necessarily  exhibit  higher 
probabilities to default ex post. On the other hand, if loan officers use the discretion to provide 
loans  to  borrowers  that  entail  a  private  benefit  to  them  or  are  otherwise  captured  by  their 
customers, these borrowers would show a higher ex post default frequency compared to other 
borrowers. In order to differentiate between the two possibilities, we directly regress our proxy 
for the use of soft information on the default outcome of the borrower, which is either 1 in the 
case of a default in the following 12 months after the rating was assigned or 0 otherwise. Note 
that the unconditional default frequency is 4.8% (see Table 2).  
 
[Table 8: ex post default about here] 
 
Table 8 shows results for this exercise. Glancing at the results in the table as a whole, most 
soft  information  proxies  tend  to  obtain  significant  coefficients,  which  suggests  that  soft 
information seems to matter for predicting the borrowers’ default, even conditioning on financial 
information. This is consistent with the previous literature (Degryse et al., 2011; Grunert et al., 28 
2005). The financial rating enters the regression significantly positively as expected, indicating 
that financially riskier borrowers are more likely to default.22  
In column I we see that |Δ Rating| obtains a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting 
that if loan officers deviate from  judging based on financial information  alone, i.e. use soft 
information  in  their  decision,  these  borrowers  are  more  likely  to  default  compared  to  those 
borrowers where loan officers only use financial information. This is evidence in favor of the 
idea that loan officers use their discretion to grant loans to customers that ex post turn out to be 
riskier compared to those where loan officers did not use such discretion. In column  II, we 
distinguish  between  upgrades  and  downgrades.  This  permits  a  distinction  between  higher 
defaults because loan officers upgraded firms too much based on positive soft information and 
higher  defaults  because  loan  officers  downgraded  firms  too  little  based  on  negative  soft 
information. It turns out that if a firm was upgraded it is as likely to default as a borrower whose 
rating was not changed due to soft information (the coefficient is -0.003 and insignificant). In 
contrast, firms that were downgraded are 0.7% more likely to default (significant at the 1% level) 
relative to firms that received a loan purely based on financial information. If we compare firms 
that were upgraded to firms that were downgraded, we find that downgraded firms are 1% more 
likely to default relative to firms that were upgraded, controlling, as before, for the financial 
rating.  
                                                 
22 The full set of covariates that is omitted from being displayed in Table 8 also includes the borrowers’ Z-Score as 
another measure of ex ante financial risk.  29 
A  similar  picture  emerges  from  the  regression  where  we  consider  the  strength  of  the 
upgrade  and  the  strength  of  the  downgrade,  given  the  firm  was  upgraded  or  downgraded, 
respectively (columns III and IV of Table 8). Firms that received a higher upgrade (by more 
notches in the rating system) were significantly less likely to default (by 0.3%) and firms that 
received a stronger downgrade were significantly more likely to default (also by 0.3%). These 
results indicate that banks are too cautious in using soft information to adapt their view on the 
borrowers’ credit risk that is formed by its financial characteristics. Ultimately, we thus do not 
find strong evidence for loan officers using soft information in a biased way.  
In columns V to VIII of Table 8 we analyze whether the relation between soft information 
and  default  is  stronger  for  borrowers  with  riskier  financials.  To  ascertain  this,  we  include 
interaction terms between the soft information proxy used and the borrowers’ financial rating. 
The evidence is consistent with banks investing more in soft information where the pay-off may 
be greatest: financially risky borrowers. Comparing upgraded and downgraded borrowers that 
are risky based on financials, we find that upgraded borrowers are 1.0% (that is 0.6% - 1.1%       
- 0.8% + 0.3%) less likely to default compared to downgraded risky borrowers (column VI). This 
difference is significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, borrowers that received a financial 
rating in the top three quartiles of the distribution and were upgraded are more likely to default 
ex  post  (0.6%).  We  interpret  this  evidence  to  suggest  that  banks  invest  in  generating  soft 
information about borrowers where the pay-off is largest, namely borrowers that have ex ante 
weak financial characteristics.  
In further unreported regressions, we check the robustness of our results with subsamples 
for which two-year and three-year risk outcome measures (the maximum we can go with our 30 
data) are available. This way we test the “evergreening” effect that banks have incentives to 
grant credit to their financially weakest borrowers in order to delay the borrowers’ defaults and 
the realization of losses on their own balance sheets (e.g., Peek and Rosengren, 2005). In our 
setup, a biased use of soft information could be offset in the short run by evergreening, while 
becoming visible in the mid to long run. We thus use two-year and three-year default measures 
and still find that upgraded borrowers are significantly less likely to default than downgraded 
borrowers. We also test the potential reverse causality of discretion on the probability to default 
(Degryse et al., 2011). While banks use soft information ex ante to predict defaults, the latter 
may  become less likely if upgrades  based on soft information  increase access  to  credit  and 
improve  loan  terms  such  as  interest  rates  and  maturity.  We  exclude  borrowers  that  borrow 
exclusively from savings banks because any reverse causality bias should be less influential for 
the remaining firms with multiple lenders as the savings banks is only one of several banks in 
these cases. We find qualitatively unchanged results for this subsample. Reverse causality thus 
seems to play no role in explaining our findings of Table 8. In addition, we split our sample with 
respect to the level of local bank competition. Results remain qualitatively unchanged in both 
samples.  
Overall, these results demonstrate that discretion in lending does not seem to increase a 
bank’s portfolio risk. Neither does discretion in lending decrease bank risk. We find no evidence 
that discretion is  used in a biased way, but  rather a tendency to  using soft information too 
cautiously, in particular for financially riskier borrowers.  31 
V.  Robustness and Extensions 
We  perform  a  number  of  robustness  checks  and  extensions.  One,  we  use  different 
measures of banks size and account for non-linearities of the size of the bank in the investment in 
soft information. We also introduce time dummies in place of macro economic control variables. 
We furthermore check the relationship between savings bank (group) size and the level of local 
bank competition. Second, we examine whether political lending ahead of local elections may 
have driven our result of a higher probability of upgrades by small banks. And finally, we check 
whether larger banks indeed have lower cost per loan ratios. 
We start with checking whether the selection result is robust to using different measures 
of bank size. For space limitations, we do not report these regressions, but they are available 
from the authors upon request. We find that using the number of bank branches or the number of 
bank employees yields qualitatively similar results in Section III. If we allow for non-linearities 
in  size  by  using  quartile  dummies  for  bank  size,  we  find  that  the  banks  in  the  largest  size 
category use less soft information, are less likely to upgrade their borrowers, and if they upgrade, 
the upgrade is by a smaller magnitude. The effects are strongest for the largest bank quartile 
(versus the smallest quartile). This is consistent with the univariate results reported earlier. In 
further checks, we replace the macroeconomic controls (risk-free interest rate, change in ifo-
Index) with  year fixed effects.  Our results  are  robust to  these alternative specifications.  We 
furthermore analyze the relationship between savings bank (group) size and the level of local 
bank  competition  to  address  concerns  that  our  results  may  be  driven  by  omitted  regional 
characteristics. We apply a double sort on bank group size (quartiles) and the level of local bank 
competition (below and above the median). Table A1 in the appendix shows that there is no 32 
evidence that larger savings banks operate in more competitive markets. In particular, the largest 
banks are located in banking markets that exhibit below average competition.  
Even though loans that benefited from a discretionary upgrade were not more likely to 
default, political lending could still drive part of our results. Smaller banks may be under larger 
political pressure in election years because they operate in smaller communities, which heavily 
rely on the savings banks’ loan supply (political lending effect). For example, Dinç (2005) shows 
that  government-owned  banks  increase  their  lending  in  election  years  in  emerging  markets 
relative  to  private  banks.  We  add  electoral  data  on  Germany’s  state  level  for  this  analysis. 
Germany has an important legislative layer below the national level, which is organized on the 
state level. Every four or five years, each of the 16 states has regional elections, which are not 
synchronized.23 The data comes from the regional statistical offices.  
Since for this test we do not rely on borrower level data we can use the individual savings 
banks' balance sheets and income statements for all 452 savings banks individually, rather than 
bank group data. By using this proprietary dataset, the sample size is larger than by using public 
sources such as Bankscope. In addition, it includes several non-publicly available data items as 
the number of mergers for each savings bank. 
 
[Table 9: electoral results about here] 
 
                                                 
23 Local elections on the county/city level are often organized at the same dates as the state wide elections. 33 
Table  9  provides  the  results.24  We regress the annual change in the commercial loan 
portfolio on bank size. The interaction term between bank size and the election variable (equals 1 
if there was a state-wide election in the respective year, 0 otherwise) is the main v ariable of 
interest.  If  small  banks  exhibit  stronger  political  lending,  we  would  observe  a  negative 
interaction term, i.e. smaller banks would increase their lending volume more in election years 
than larger banks would. In line with Dinç (2005), we find t hat commercial credit volume is 
increased in state-wide election years. Concentrating on the interaction term between the dummy 
variable  Election  and  the  bank  size  measure  (column  2),  we  find  that  credit  volume  is  not 
expanded disproportionately by smaller banks in election years. Hence, we do not find evidence 
for particular political pressure on smaller banks to extend loan supply.  
Next, we examine whether there are differences in costs between small and large banks in 
granting loans. Having an informational advantage by gathering soft information may go hand in 
hand  with  higher  screening/monitoring  costs  at  relationship  banks  (Boot  and  Thakor,  2000; 
Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). Compared to transaction banks, margins and charter values may 
be  lower  at  relationship  banks,  which  may  result  in  a  greater  willingness  to  accept  riskier 
borrowers (e.g. Keeley, 1990; Hellmann et al., 2000). 
 
[Table 10: bank cost regressions about here] 
 
                                                 
24 We use a sample with a longer time series (1996-2006 instead of 2002-2006), as we do not rely on the rating data, 
which are available only for the shorter time period. We also estimated the model for 2002 to 2006 and also do not 
obtain a political lending effect. The results are available from the authors upon request.  34 
We rely on three bank (group) level measures for costs per loan: i) sum of staff cost over 
average assets per bank group and year (in percent); ii) number of bank branches (in hundreds) 
over the average assets per bank group (in billions) and year; iii) number of bank FTEs (in 
thousands) over the average assets per bank group (in billions) and year. Table 10 shows the 
results for which we regress the three proxies on bank size (measured by the natural logarithm of 
bank assets). The bank size coefficient enters significantly in the regressions for all three proxies. 
We find that smaller banks have higher staff cost, use more branches and have more employees 
(per  unit  of  assets).  This  is  consistent  with  a  cost  advantage  for  large  banks  in 
screening/monitoring  that  they  may  use  to  offset  the  informational  disadvantage  and  the 
associated  selection  problem.  Unreported  robustness  checks,  which  are  available  from  the 
authors on request, further include bank fixed effects to control for unobservable time-invariant 
characteristics. We also test whether the results in Table 10 are robust for non-linearities in size 
by using size quartile dummies. This should alleviate concerns about any mechanical correlation 
between  ln(Bank  assets)  and  the  three  dependent  variables  which  use  bank  assets  as 
denominator. The main results remain qualitatively unchanged.  
VI.  Conclusion 
We start from the idea that soft information can be viewed as private information about a 
borrower that is observable to a relationship bank but not to a transaction bank (Inderst and 
Müller,  2007),  resulting  in  a  Akerlof-type  adverse  selection  effect:  Firms  with  positive  soft 
information optimally self-select to relationship banks, firms with negative soft information to 
transaction  banks.  Transaction  banks  therefore  face  disproportionately  many  borrowers  with 35 
negative soft information and adjust their lending behavior accordingly. The interaction between 
relationship and transaction banks is also affected by the competitive environment, which from a 
theoretical perspective may result in more or less investment in gathering soft information by 
both types of banks.  
We use a matched bank-borrower dataset of German savings banks that has three distinct 
advantages: One, we observe whether the lender used positive or negative soft information in the 
lending decision. Second, due to restrictions on the geographic operations of the banks in our 
sample, we can accurately measure their competitive environment. Third, we have information 
on  borrower  ex  post  defaults  and  therefore  can  check  whether  soft  information  was  used 
efficiently. 
Using  these  unique  data,  we  are  able  to  uncover  two  empirical  results  that  to  our 
knowledge have so far not been documented in the literature. One, we find that borrowers with 
riskier financial characteristics are more likely to obtain credit from relationship banks than from 
transaction banks if they have positive soft information. In contrast, financially riskier firms with 
negative soft information are more likely to turn to a transaction bank. This evidence supports 
adverse selection in  the market  for small  business  loans. Second, we show that competition 
affects  relationship  banks’  and  transaction  banks’  investment  in  gathering  soft  information 
asymmetrically.  Relationship  banks  tend  to  increase  their  investment  in  gathering  soft 
information, while transaction banks reduce it. An increase in competition results in a further 
specialization of banks, but does not necessarily reduce the overall investment in gathering soft 
information. Hence, interbank competition may not reduce the availability of credit to firms with 
weak  financials  but  strong  soft  information,  as  some  previous  theory  has  suggested  (e.g. 36 
Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). All of these results are more pronounced for firms where soft 
information can ex ante to be expected to play a greater role in the lending decision: firms with 
weak financials and more opaque firms. 
Further, our results suggest that discretion by loan officers is used efficiently in the sense 
that firms with upgrades in their rating based on soft information are not more likely to default 
than  other  firms.  Taking  soft  information  into  account  may  reduce  credit  constraints  for 
financially weak or opaque firms.  
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Table 1: Definition of variables 
The table gives the definitions of all variables used in the empirical analysis. Destatis is the federal statistical office 
of Germany and Bundesbank is the German central bank. 
 
Variable name   Description   Data source  
Panel A: Dependent variables        
|Δ Rating|  Absolute difference in notches between financial rating and end rating. 
Both ratings range from 1 (AAA) to 21 (C). 
Savings banks 
Upgrade   Equals 1 for a positive change of the financial rating based on soft 
information, 0 otherwise 
Savings banks 
Downgrade   Equals 1 for a negative change of the financial rating based on soft 
information, 0 otherwise 
Savings banks 
Strength(Upgrade)   Strength of a positive change of financial rating based on soft information 
in notches 
Savings banks 
Strength(Downgrade)   Strength of a negative change of financial rating based on soft information 
in notches 
Savings banks 
Default borrower  Equals 1 if the borrower defaults up to 12 months after the rating was 
assigned, 0 otherwise 
Savings banks 
Credit volume change  Annual commercial credit volume change (in percent) for each individual 
savings bank 
Savings banks 
Staff cost / Bank assets  Sum of staff cost over average assets per bank and year (in percent)  Savings banks 
Bank branches / Bank assets  Number of bank branches (in hundreds) over the average assets per bank 
(in billions) and year 
Savings banks 
Bank FTEs / Bank assets  Number of bank FTEs (in thousands) over the average assets per bank (in 
billions) and year 
Savings banks 
        
Panel B: Independent variables        
ln(Bank assets)  Natural logarithm of total assets (in billion) of the savings bank (or 
savings bank group)  
Savings banks 
Direct competition   Branches of direct competitors (commercial banks and cooperative banks) 
to savings banks branches per group of savings banks  
Bundesbank  
Z-Score borrower  Altman's Z-Score calibrated to the German banking market 
(approximation of the credit risk of each individual loan customer), 
defined by 
Savings banks  
   Z-Score = 0.717*Working capital/Assets + 0.847*Retained 
earnings/Assets +  3.107*Net profits/Assets + 0.420*Net worth/Liabilities 
+ 0.998*Sales/Assets  
  
Financial rating borrower  A borrower's financial rating, numerical notches from 1 (AAA) to 21 (C)  Savings banks 
Number mergers   Number of mergers within a group of savings banks per year   Savings banks 
Regional debt per capita  Debt per capita of the community that the savings bank (or savings bank 
group) is located in  
Destatis  
Δ ifo-Index  Relative change in ifo business climate index at the national level  ifo institute  
Risk-free interest rate   Average daily risk-free interest rate at the national level (in percent)  Bundesbank  
ln(Borrower assets)  Natural logarithm of total assets per borrower (in 1,000)  Savings banks  
Opaque borrower  Equals 1 for closely held borrowers that are more opaque, 0 otherwise  Savings banks 
Industry specialization  Herfindahl-Index based on share of loan volumes per industry:  Savings banks 
  Industry specialization = Σi (Loan volume industryi/Total loan volume)   
Election 
Equals 1 if there was a state-wide election in the respective year, 0 
otherwise 
Destatis  43 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
This table shows descriptive statistics of the main variables. The definitions of variables are given in Table 1.  
 
Variable  Observations  Mean  Std. dev.  5p  25p  Median  75p  95p 
Panel A: Dependent variables                          
|Δ Rating|  77,364  2.022  1.549  0.000  1.000  2.000  3.000  5.000 
Upgrade (dummy variable)  77,364  0.245  0.430  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000 
Downgrade (dummy variable)  77,364  0.598  0.490  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Strength(Upgrade)   18,982  2.475  1.626  1.000  1.000  2.000  3.000  6.000 
Strength(Downgrade)   46,238  2.368  1.286  1.000  1.000  2.000  3.000  5.000 
Default borrower  77,364  0.048  0.213  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Credit volume change (in percent)  4,668  0.517  10.072  -16.189  -3.503  1.053  5.573  13.656 
Staff cost / bank assets (in percent)  2,140  1.355  0.187  1.007  1.246  1.368  1.482  1.637 
Number of bank branches / bank assets  2,140  20.291  9.291  8.148  13.606  19.494  24.769  36.171 
Number of bank FTEs / bank assets  2,140  2.404  0.401  1.719  2.161  2.404  2.675  3.046 
                          
Panel B: Independent variables                          
ln(Bank assets)  77,364  0.824  0.721  -0.130  0.360  0.681  1.051  2.528 
Direct competition   77,364  0.841  0.252  0.461  0.667  0.823  0.945  1.361 
Z-Score borrower  77,364  3.399  3.008  0.523  1.654  2.786  4.353  8.093 
Financial rating borrower  77,364  12.394  3.403  8.000  10.000  12.000  14.000  20.000 
Number mergers   77,364  0.364  0.696  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  2.000 
Regional debt per capita (Euro thousands)  77,364  1.064  0.403  0.624  0.809  0.960  1.217  1.836 
Δ ifo-Index  77,364  1.875  2.007  -2.583  0.125  2.200  3.642  3.642 
Risk-free interest rate (in percent)  77,364  2.276  0.360  2.048  2.048  2.090  2.318  3.278 
ln(Borrower assets)  77,364  6.424  1.498  4.259  5.406  6.244  7.250  9.236 
Opaque borrower (dummy variable)  77,364  0.515  0.500  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Industry specialization  77,364  20.728  3.739  15.797  18.101  20.197  22.834  26.761 
Election (dummy variable)  4,668  0.198  0.398  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000 44 
Table 3: Discretionary lending and bank size 
Panel A shows the results of the univariate analysis on the impact of discretion in relationship lending. We split the borrowers into four groups 
depending on the bank groups’ average assets, which approximates relationship strength. The first column provides the averages for borrowers 
of the smallest banks, while the forth column shows the averages for borrowers of the largest banks. Column 5 provides the average differences 
between the largest and the smallest bank size quartiles and the significance level. We use univariate regressions with standard errors clustered 
at the savings banks' group level. Panel B contains the results of OLS models regressing discretion in lending on bank size. We use the matched 
bank-borrower dataset including the five measures for discretion in lending of Panel A. The natural logarithm of bank assets approximates 
relationship strength. See Table 1 for the definitions of all variables. Standard errors are clustered at the savings banks' group level. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Univariate analysis 
Soft information  Bank size, measured by average assets       
measure  1, Small  2  3  4, Large  Large - Small 
|Δ Rating|  2.039  2.106  1.994  1.951  -0.088** 
Upgrade  0.249  0.272  0.249  0.212  -0.037* 
Downgrade  0.593  0.582  0.590  0.626  0.033 
Strength(Upgrade)  2.519  2.625  2.474  2.230  -0.289*** 
Strength(Downgrade)  2.380  2.393  2.338  2.361  -0.019 
 
 
Panel B: Multivariate analysis 
   |Δ Rating|  Upgrade  Downgrade  Strength(Upgrade)  Strength(Downgrade) 
ln(Bank assets)  -0.064***  -0.017*  0.011  -0.142***  -0.024 
Direct competition  0.021  0.015  -0.011  -0.041  0.020 
Number mergers  -0.008  -0.009*  0.007  -0.029  0.011 
Regional debt per capita  0.060*  -0.010  0.023  -0.037  0.049 
Δ ifo-Index  0.020***  0.003  -0.001  0.023**   0.016*** 
Risk-free interest rate  0.256***  0.030**  -0.007  0.227***  0.240*** 
ln(Borrower assets)  -0.134***  -0.038***  0.021***  -0.294***  -0.041*** 
Intercept  2.238***  0.430***  0.454***  3.894***  2.007*** 
                 
Observations  77,364  77,364  77,364  18,982  46,238 
Adj. R square  0.021  0.019  0.005  0.074  0.006 45 
Table 4: Borrower selection and financial risk: univariate analysis 
The table contains the univariate results for the borrower selection with respect to bank size using the matched bank-
borrower dataset. Panel A shows the probability of receiving an upgrade based on soft information, while Panel B 
shows the probability of receiving an downgrade based on soft information. We split the samples according to the 
borrowers’ Z-Score quartile. The first quartile includes the riskiest borrowers while the forth quartile contains the 
safest borrowers. The first and second columns show the upgrade probability reflecting soft information for the 
smallest and the largest bank size quartile. Bank size is measured according to the sum of bank group assets in the 
respective year. The third column shows the difference between column one and two and the significance level. We 
use univariate regressions with standard errors clustered at the savings banks' group level. See Table 1 for the 
definitions of all  variables. Standard errors are clustered at the savings banks' group level.  *,  **,  ***  indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  
Panel A: Probability of receiving an upgrade, related to ex ante financial risk and bank size 
   Bank size quartile    
Z-Score quartile  Smallest  Largest  Difference 
1 (risky)  0.277  0.195  0.082*** 
2  0.217  0.179  0.039* 
3  0.213  0.184  0.029 
4 (safe)  0.294  0.274  0.020 
           
Total  0.249  0.212  0.037* 
1 - 4        0.062*** 
 
 
Panel B: Probability of receiving an downgrade, related to ex ante financial risk and bank size 
   Bank size quartile    
Z-Score quartile  Smallest  Largest  Difference 
1 (risky)  0.633  0.714  -0.081*** 
2  0.649  0.713  -0.064*** 
3  0.607  0.649  -0.042 
4 (safe)  0.465  0.475  -0.011 
           
Total  0.593  0.626  -0.033 
1 - 4        -0.070*** 
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Table 5: Borrower selection and financial risk: regressions 
 
Table 5 shows OLS regression results. We regress the upgrade probability on borrower risk and bank size. The 
dummy  variable  Risky  borrower  equals  1  for  borrowers  in  the  riskiest  Z-Score  (financial  rating)  quartile.  The 
dummy variables Small bank equals 1 for the smallest size quartile. We use a Mid size bank dummy for the second 
and third bank size quartile while Large bank serves as the omitted category. High competition is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the competition level is above the median and 0 otherwise. We omit the individual effects for Mid 
size bank, all interaction terms with that variable, and the other covariates for space considerations. See Table 1 for 
the definitions of all variables. Standard errors are clustered at the savings banks' group level. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
   I  II  III  IV 
Risky borrower dummy (Z-Score)  0.030***     -0.016**    
Risky borrower dummy (Financial rating)     0.505***     0.432*** 
Small bank dummy  0.031*  0.005  0.018  -0.012 
Risky borrower (Z-Score) * Small bank        0.055***    
Risky borrower (Financial rating) * Small bank           0.085** 
High competition dummy  -0.014  -0.017*  -0.014  -0.018* 
High competition * Small bank             
              
Full set of covariates  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  77,364  77,364  77,364  77,364 
Adj. R square  0.026  0.267  0.026  0.268 
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Table 6: Borrower selection, opacity and competition 
 
Table 6 shows OLS regression results. We regress the upgrade probability on borrower opacity and bank size. We 
use  the  borrowers'  legal  form  to  distinguish  between  closely  held  firms  (OhG,  Personengesellschaft)  and 
incorporated firms (GmbH, AG etc.), as they have different accounting and transparency standards. The dummy 
variable Opaque borrower equals 1 for the former and 0 for the latter type of firms. The dummy variables Small 
bank equals 1 for the smallest size quartile. We use a Mid size bank dummy for the second and third bank size 
quartile while Large bank serves as the omitted category. High competition is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
competition  level  is  above  the  median  and  0  otherwise.  We  omit  the  individual  effects  for  Mid  size  bank,  all 
interaction terms with that variable, and the other covariates for space considerations. See Table 1 for the definitions 
of all variables. Standard errors are clustered at the savings banks' group level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
   I  II  III  IV  V 
Opaque borrower dummy  0.065***  0.054***  0.065***  0.054***  0.060*** 
Small bank dummy  0.033**  0.035*  0.021  0.033**  0.027 
Opaque borrower * Small bank     -0.001        -0.011 
High competition dummy  -0.013  -0.013  -0.057***  -0.024*  -0.045**  
High competition * Small bank        0.045*     0.026 
High competition * Opaque borrower           0.021**  -0.029**  
High competition * Opaque borrower * Small bank              0.043**  
                 
Full set of covariates  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  77,364  77,364  77,364  77,364  77,364 
Adj. R square  0.025  0.026  0.026  0.026  0.026 
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Table 7: Borrower selection and competition 
 
Table 7 shows OLS regression results. The dependent variable is the upgrade probability. The dummy variable Risky borrower equals 1 for 
borrowers in the riskiest Z-Score (financial rating) quartile. The dummy variables Small bank equals 1 for the smallest size quartile. We use a 
Mid size bank dummy for the second and third bank size quartile while Large bank serves as the omitted category. High competition is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the competition level is above the median and 0 otherwise. We omit the individual effects for Mid size bank, all 
interaction terms with that variable, and the other covariates for space considerations. See Table 1 for the definitions of all variables. Standard 
errors are clustered at the savings banks' group level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
   I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
Risky borrower dummy (Z-Score)  0.030***                   0.011     -0.01                  
Risky borrower dummy (Financial rating)     0.504***     0.498***     0.461*** 
Small bank dummy  0.018  -0.004  0.031*  0.005  0.009  -0.017 
Risky borrower (Z-Score) * Small bank                            0.043***                  
Risky borrower (Financial rating) * Small bank                               0.062*   
High competition dummy  -0.059***  -0.052***  -0.024*  -0.020**  -0.052***  -0.027*   
High competition * Small bank  0.046*  0.033        0.034  0.014 
High competition * Risky borrower (Z-Score)                      0.037***     -0.023***                  
High competition * Risky borrower (Financial rating)                         0.012     -0.147*** 
High competition * Risky borrower (Z-Score) * Small bank                            0.040**                  
High competition * Risky borrower (Financial rating) * Small bank                            0.126*** 
                    
Full set of covariates  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  77,364  77,364  77,364  77,364  77,364  77,364 
Adj. R square  0.026  0.267  0.026  0.267  0.027  0.269 
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Table 8: Discretionary lending and borrowers’ ex post default risk  
The table contains marginal effects from Probit estimates with the borrowers’ default dummy variable (1 equals default, 0 otherwise) as the 
dependent variable and the five discretionary lending proxies as the main independent variables for the matched bank-borrower dataset. Risky 
borrower equals 1 for borrowers of the riskiest quartile according to the Z-Score and 0 otherwise. We conduct Wald tests in columns 2 and 6 
for Upgrade = Downgrade and in column 6 also for the interaction effects Upgrade * Risky borrower = Downgrade * Risky borrower. See 
Table 1 for the definitions of the list of covariates that are omitted from being displayed in the table. Standard errors are clustered at the savings 
banks' group level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
   I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII 
|Δ Rating|  0.001*                         0.003***                        
Upgrade     -0.003                         0.006*                     
Downgrade     0.007***                         0.008***                     
Strength(Upgrade)        -0.003**                         0.000                  
Strength(Downgrade)           0.003***           0.003*** 
Financial rating  0.008***  0.009***  0.018***  0.008***  0.010***  0.010***  0.018***  0.008*** 
|Δ Rating| * Risky borrower              -0.005***                        
Upgrade * Risky borrower                 -0.011***                     
Downgrade * Risky borrower                 -0.003                     
Strength(Upgrade) * Risky borrower                    -0.004                  
Strength(Downgrade) * Risky borrower                       0.000 
                          
Wald tests                         
Upgrade = Downgrade     -0.010***           -0.002       
Upgrade * Risky borrower =                 -0.008***       
Downgrade * Risky borrower                         
                          
Full set of covariates  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Bank group fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  77,364  77,364  18,982  46,238  77,364  77,364  18,982  46,238 50 
Table 9: Political lending  
The table contains the results for the analysis of the political lending effect. We regress the annual change in the 
commercial loan portfolio on the savings banks’ assets using the dataset on the individual bank level for the years 
1996-2006. See Table 1 for the definitions of all variables. Standard errors are clustered at the savings banks' group 
level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
   (I)  (II) 
Election  1.428***  1.262*** 
ln(Bank assets)  -0.300  -0.474*** 
Election * ln(Bank assets)     0.860 
Direct competition  -0.336  -0.322 
Number mergers  -0.876  -0.878 
Regional debt per capita  1.115***  1.121*** 
Δ ifo-Index  0.335***  0.335*** 
Risk-free interest rate  0.056  0.058 
Intercept  -1.054  -1.046 
        
Observations  4,668  4,668 
Adj. R square  0.027  0.028 
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Table 10: Costs per loan  
The table contains the results for the analysis of the relationship between the costs per loan and banks size. We 
regress three proxies of screening/monitoring intensity on bank size. See Table 1 for the definitions of all variables. 
Standard errors are clustered at the savings banks' group level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. 
 
  
Staff cost / assets 
(in percent) 
Number of bank 
branches / assets 
Number of bank FTEs / 
assets 
ln(Bank assets)  -0.080***  -3.465***  -0.180*** 
Direct competition  0.046  8.613***  0.168*   
Number mergers  0.053***  1.190  0.085**  
Regional debt per capita  0.000  0.003**  0.000**  
Δ ifo-Index  0.002***  -0.099***  -0.009*** 
Risk-free interest rate  -0.035***  0.367**  0.030*** 
Intercept  1.438***  9.665***  1.995*** 
           
Observations  2,140  2,140  2,140 
Adj. R square  0.163  0.164  0.206 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Additional sample characteristics 
The table shows the number of observations sorted by bank size and bank competition. See Table 1 for the general 
data definitions and Table 5 for the bank competition measure. 
 
   Bank competition          
Bank size quartile  Below median  Above median     Total 
1 (Smallest)  14,138  5,507    19,645 
2  6,648  12,506    19,154 
3  3,463  16,082    19,545 
4 (Largest)  14,925  4,095    19,020 
         
Total  39,174  38,190     77,364 
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